Recent theoretical advances describing consciousness from information and integration have highlighted the unique role of the thalamocortical system in leading to integrated information and thus, consciousness. Here, we examined the differential distributions of specific and nonspecific thalamocortical functional connections using resting-state fMRI in a group of healthy subjects and vegetative-state patients. We found that both thalamic systems were widely distributed, but they exhibited different patterns. Nonspecific connections were preferentially associated with brain regions involved in higher-order cognitive processing, self-awareness and introspective (...) mentalizing . In contrast, specific connections were prevalent in the ventral and posterior part of the prefrontal and precuneus, known involved in representing externally-directed attentions. Significant reductions of functional connectivity in both systems, especially the nonspecific system, were observed in VS. These data suggest that brain networks sustaining information and integration may be differentiated by the nature of their thalamic functional connectivity. (shrink)

Information processing that subserves conscious cognitive functions is thought to involve recurrent signaling through feedforward and feedback loops among hierarchically arranged functional regions of the cerebral cortex. In the current issue of Consciousness and Cognition, Lee et al. report that loss of consciousness, as produced by a bolus injection of the general anesthetic propofol to human volunteers, was accompanied by a decrease in wide-band EEG feedback connectivity from frontal cortex to parietal cortex, confirming a prediction from previous experimental studies. Interestingly, (...) frontoparietal feedback connectivity did not fully recover after the anesthetic effect wore off and the subjects first opened their eyes in response to a verbal command. Possible interpretations of the results and their implications with respect to the neural correlates of consciousness and unconsciousness are discussed. (shrink)

In this chapter, it is argued that the Mind-Body Powers model of neural correlates of consciousness provides a metaphysical framework that yields the theoretical possibility of empirically detecting consciousness. Since the model is informed by an Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphic ontology rather than a physicalist ontology, it provides a philosophical foundation for the science of consciousness that is an alternative to physicalism. Our claim is not that the Mind-Body Powers model provides the only alternative, but rather that it provides a sufficient framework (...) for empirically detecting and scientifically studying consciousness. Elsewhere, the integrated information theory’s prediction about the neural correlate of being conscious has been used to illustrate how the Mind-Body Powers model grounds the possibility of empirically detecting consciousness (see M. Owen, 2021, ch. 8). The theory’s prediction was used as one plausible example of a hypothesis about the nature and location of the neural correlate that can be combined with the model. However, there is no settled conclusion about which neurobiological theory of consciousness accurately identifies the neural mechanisms corresponding to being conscious (NAS, 2021, p. 39; Sattin et al., 2021; Seth, 2017; Seth & Bayne, 2022). Therefore, this work will employ another plausible neurobiological prediction provided by the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis. The hypothesis is combined with the Mind-Body Powers model to demonstrate that empirically detecting consciousness is metaphysically plausible wholly apart from a physicalist framework. (shrink)

Organoids and specifically human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are one of the most relevant novelties in the field of biomedical research. Grown either from embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells, HCOs can be used as in vitro three-dimensional models, mimicking the developmental process and organization of the developing human brain. Based on that, and despite their current limitations, it cannot be assumed that they will never at any stage of development manifest some rudimentary form of consciousness. In the absence of behavioral (...) indicators of consciousness, the theoretical neurobiology of consciousness being applied to unresponsive brain-injured patients can be considered with respect to HCOs. In clinical neurology, it is difficult to discern a capacity for consciousness in unresponsive brain-injured patients who provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. In such scenarios, a validated neurobiological theory of consciousness, which tells us what the neural mechanisms of consciousness are, could be used to identify a capacity for consciousness. Like the unresponsive patients that provide a diagnostic difficulty for neurologists, HCOs provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. Therefore, this article discusses how three prominent neurobiological theories of consciousness apply to human cerebral organoids. From the perspective of the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Integrated Information Theory, we discuss what neuronal structures and functions might indicate that cerebral organoids have a neurobiological capacity to be conscious. (shrink)

Ch. 1. Filosofskoe osmyslenie kulʹtury -- ch. 2. Problemy mnozhestvennosti kulʹtur.

This paper describes the topological aspect of a logic-based, artificial intelligence approach to formalising the qualitative description of spatial properties and relations, and reasoning about those properties and relations. This approach, known as RCC theory, has been under development for several years at the University of Leeds. The main rationale for this project is that qualitative descriptions of spatial properties and relationships, and qualitative spatial reasoning, are of fundamental importance in human thinking about the world: even where quantitative spatial data (...) are most important, they must be attached to the components of a perceived spatial structure if we are to make use of them. RCC theory covers other qualitative aspects of spatial description and reasoning, but the topological properties and relations of spatially extended entities are fundamental to our work. The topological formalisms used by mathematicians are, in general, not well suited to the task of formalising the kinds of ‘common-sense’ or ‘everyday’ qualitative spatial description and reasoning which are our primary interest. Nevertheless, we must come to grips with the concepts of topology as practised by mathematicians if we are not to risk constantly ‘reinventing wheels’. (shrink)

It was with this bitter intervention from Thrasymachus, occurring halfway through the first of its ten Books, that that work begins to come urgently alive. For the remainder of Book I the Socrates of the Dialogue asks questions and raises objections, while Thrasymachus keeps urging that in fact the just become through their very justice the victims of exploitation–the suckers!

Bateson's belated acceptance of the chromosome theory came in two main stages, and was permanent, although he retained to the end reservations about some implications and extensions of the theory. Coleman's attempt to explain Bateson's resistance in terms of his conservative mode of thought is critically examined, and rejected: the attributes Coleman assigns to Bateson are all either inappropriate, or irrelevant to chromosome theory, or both. Instead, the diverse factors which contributed to Bateson's resistance are enumerated and discussed. These include (...) deficiencies in the evidence then available to support the theory; embryological difficulties; Bateson's aversion to microscopy combined with the lack of a close colleague skilled in cytology; his iconoclastic temperament, and the fact that he found T. H. Morgan, the leader of the Drosophila school, an uncongenial personality. Taken together, these factors suffice to account for his resistance. Bateson's position is contrasted with that of the other most eminent opponent, W. Johannsen, whose organismic outlook was the main obstacle to acceptance. (shrink)

At their extremes, the modernization of ancient mathematical texts (absolute presentism) leaves nothing of the source and the refusal to modernize (absolute antiquarism) changes nothing. The extremes exist only as tendencies. This paper attempts to justify the admissibility of broad modernization of mathematical sources (presentism) in the context of a socio-cultural (non-fundamentalist) philosophy of mathematics.

Suffering patients (when able), grieving families and compassionate physicians have always sought the least detrimental alternative while deciding care in the face of tragedy. Modern medical technology has brought great benefits to patients but has blurred traditional concepts of life and death and created new dilemmas for practising doctors. While this technology has given doctors great control over living and dying, their dominance in critical decision making is being challenged. More and more their decisions are liable to public and legal (...) scrutiny, intense publicity by the news media and exploitation by lobbyists with opposing aims. Increasing pressure of this kind may deflect the physician form his primary responsibility to patients and their families. For infants with gross malformations or a distressing terminal illness we believe that the parents and their doctors must be allowed primary decisional power even if the chosen course of action involves the death of the infant. Choices for death should be permitted but only after suitable family and professional consultation. Some general guidelines are suggested. As these situations are so varied and so complex, much latitude in decision-making should be expected and tolerated. (shrink)

Why is it that despite having many of the same concerns on how ethics may be included in undergraduate medical curriculums, I write to state my concerns on Cowley’s formulation and conclusions.1I think my main problem is with an argument that starts from a position of criticising “universalising”, but offers as a substitute the idealising of another universality—“their own healthy intuitions and vocabulary”. What is it that can help in promoting an appreciation of what may be a “healthy”, as opposed (...) to an “unhealthy”, intuition? At the risk of immediately undermining my argument by indulging in psychoanalytical …. (shrink)